Abstract. We propose an algorithm for computing an isogeny between two elliptic curves E1, E2 defined over a finite field such that there is an imaginary quadratic order O satisfying O ≃ End(Ei) for i = 1, 2. This concerns ordinary curves and supersingular curves defined over Fp (the latter used in the recent CSIDH proposal). Our algorithm has heuris- We also show that a variant of our method has asymptotic run time eÕ √ log(|∆|) while requesting only polynomial memory (both quantum and classical).
Introduction
Given two elliptic curves E 1 , E 2 defined over a finite field F q , the isogeny problem is to compute an isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 , i.e. a non-constant morphism that maps the identity point on E 1 to the identity point on E 2 . There are two different types of elliptic curves: ordinary and supersingular. The latter have very particular properties that impact the resolution of the isogeny problem. The first instance of a cryptosystem based on the hardness of computing isogenies was due to Couveignes [12] , and its concept was independently rediscovered by Stolbunov [31] . Both proposals used ordinary curves.
Childs, Jao and Soukharev observed in [11] that the problem of finding an isogeny between two ordinary curves E 1 , E 2 defined over F q and having the same endomorphism ring could be reduced to the problem of finding a subgroup of the dihedral group. More specifically, let K = Q( t 2 − 4q) where t is the trace of the Frobenius endomorphism of the curves, and let O ⊆ K be the quadratic order isomorphic to the ring of endomorphisms of E 1 and E 2 . Let Cl(O) be the ideal class group of O. Classes of ideals act on isomorphism classes of curves with endomorphism ring isomorphic to O. Finding an isogeny between E 1 and E 2 boils down to finding an ideal a such that [a] * E 1 = E 2 where * is the action of Cl(O), [a] is the class of a in Cl(O) and E i is the isomorphism class of the curve E i . Childs, Jao and Soukharev showed that this could be done by finding a subgroup of Z 2 ⋉ Z N , where N = # Cl(O) ∼ |t 2 − 4q|. Using Kuperberg's sieve [25] to evaluate this oracle, meaning that the total cost is 2Õ √ log(N ) .
To avoid this subexponential attack, Jao and De Feo [21] described an analogue of these isogeny-based systems that works with supersingular curves. The endomorphism ring of such curves is a maximal order in a quaternion algebra. The non-commutativity of the (left)-ideals acting on isomorphism classes of curves thwarts the attacks mentioned above, but it also restricts the possibilities offered by supersingular isogenies, which are typically used for a DiffieHellman type of key exchange (known as SIDH) and for digital signatures. Most recently, two independent works revisited isogeny-based cryptosystems by restricting themselves to cases where the subexponential attacks based on the action of Cl(O) was applicable. The scheme known as CSIDH by Castryck et al. [10] uses supersingular curves and isogenies defined over F p , while the scheme of De Feo, Kieffer and Smith [14] uses ordinary curves with many practical optimizations. In both cases, the appeal of using commutative structures is to allow more functionalities, such as static-static key exchange protocols that are not possible with SIDH without an expensive Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [2] . The downside is that one needs to carefully assess the hardness of the computation of isogenies in this context.
Contribution
. Let E 1 , E 2 be two elliptic curves defined over a finite field such that there is an imaginary quadratic order O satisfying O ≃ End(E i ) for i = 1, 2 and ∆ = disc(O). In this note, we provide new insight regarding the security of CSIDH as follows:
1. We describe a quantum algorithm for computing an isogeny between E 1 and E 2 with heuristic asymptotic run time in e O √ log(|∆|) and with quantum memory in Poly (log(|∆|)) and quantumly accessible classical memory in
We show that we can use a variant of this method to compute an isogeny between E 1 and E 2 in time e √ ln(|∆|) ln ln(|∆|) with polynomial memory (both classical and quantum).
Our contributions bear similarities to the recent independent work of Bonnetain and Schrottenloher [7] . The main differences are that they rely on a generating set l 1 , . . . , l u where u ∈ Θ(log(|∆|)) of the class group provided with the CSIDH protocol, and that their approach does not have asymptotic run time in e O √ log(|∆|) . The asymptotic run time of the method of [7] was not analyzed.
However, using similar techniques as the ones presented in this paper, one could conclude that the run time of the method of [7] is in eÕ √ log(|∆|) . The extra logarithmic factors in the exponent come from the use of the BKZ reduction [28] with block size in O log(|∆|) in a lattice of Z u . Section 4.2 elaborates on the differences between our algorithm and [7] . The run time of the variant described in Contribution 2 is asymptotically comparable to that of the algorithm of Childs, Jao and Soukharev [11] , and to that of Bonnetain and Schrottenloher [7] (if its exact time complexity was to be worked out). The main appeal of our variant is the fact that it uses a polynomial amount of memory, which is likely to impact the performances in practice.
Mathematical background
An elliptic curve defined over a finite field F q of characteristic p = 2, 3 is an algebraic variety given by an equation of the form E : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b, where a, b ∈ F q and 4a
3 + 27b 2 = 0. A more general form gives an affine model in the case p = 2, 3 but it is not useful in the scope of this paper since we derive an asymptotic result. The set of points of an elliptic curve can be equipped with an additive group law. Details about the arithmetic of elliptic curves can be found in many references, such as [30, Chap. 3] .
Let E 1 , E 2 be two elliptic curves defined over F q . An isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 is a non-constant rational map defined over F q which is also a group homomorphism from E 1 to E 2 . Two curves are isogenous over F q if and only if they have the same number of points over F q (see [33] ). Two curves over F q are said to be isomorphic over F q if there is an F q -isomorphism between their group of points. Two such curves have the same j-invariant given by j := 1728 4a 3 4a 3 +27b 2 . In this paper, we treat isogenies as mappings between (representatives of) F q -isomorphism classes of elliptic curves. In other words, given two j-invariants j 1 , j 2 ∈ F q , we wish to construct an isogeny between (any) two elliptic curves E 1 , E 2 over F q having jinvariant j 1 (respectively j 2 ). Such an isogeny exists if and only if Φ ℓ (j 1 , j 2 ) = 0 for some ℓ, where Φ ℓ (X, Y ) is the ℓ-th modular polynomial.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over F q . An isogeny between E and itself defined over F q n for some n > 0 is called an endomorphism of E. The set of endomorphisms of E is a ring that we denote by End(E). For each integer m, the multiplication-by-m map [m] on E is an endomorphism. Therefore, we always have Z ⊆ End(E). Moreover, to each isogeny φ :
where m = deg(φ). For elliptic curves defined over a finite field, we know that Z End(E). In this particular case, End(E) is either an order in an imaginary quadratic field (and has Z-rank 2) or an order in a quaternion algebra ramified at p (the characteristic of the base field) and ∞ (and has Z-rank 4). In the former case, E is said to be ordinary while in the latter it is called supersingular. When a supersingular curve is defined over F p , then the ring of its F p -endomorphisms is isomorphic to an imaginary quadratic order, much like in the ordinary case.
An order O in a field K such that [K : Q] = n is a subring of K which is a Z-module of rank n. The notion of ideal of O can be generalized to fractional ideals, which are sets of the form a = The endomorphism ring of an elliptic curve plays a crucial role in most algorithms for computing isogenies between curves. The class group of End(E) acts transitively on isomorphism classes of elliptic curves (that is, on j-invariants of curves) having the same endomorphism ring. More precisely, the class of an ideal a ⊆ O acts on the isomorphism class of a curve E with End(E) ≃ O via an isogeny of degree N (a) (the algebraic norm of a). Likewise, each isogeny ϕ : E → E ′ where End(E) = End(E ′ ) ≃ O corresponds (up to isomorphism) to the class of an ideal in O. From an ideal a and the ℓ-torsion (where ℓ = N (a)), one can recover the kernel of ϕ, and then using Vélu's formulae [34] , one can derive the corresponding isogeny. We denote by [a] * E the action of the ideal class of a on the isomorphism class of the curve E. The typical strategy to evaluate the action of [a] is to decompose it as a product of classes of prime ideals of small norm, and evaluate the action of each prime ideals as ℓ-isogenies. This strategy was first described by Couveignes [12] and later by Bröker-Charles-Lauter [9] and reused in many subsequent works.
Notation: In this paper, log denotes the base 2 logarithm while ln denotes the natural logarithm.
The CSIDH static-static key exchange
As pointed out in [15] , the original SIDH key agreement protocol is not secure when using the same secret over multiple instances of the protocol. This can be fixed by a Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [2] at the cost of a drastic loss of performance, requiring additional points in the protocol, and loss of flexibility, for example, the inability to reuse keys. These issues motivated the description of CSIDH [10] which uses supersingular curves defined over F p .
When Alice and Bob wish to create a shared secret, they rely on their longterm secrets [a] and [b] which are classes of ideals in the ideal class group of O, where O is isomorphic to the F p -endomorphism ring of a supersingular curve E defined over F p . Much like the original Diffie-Hellman protocol [13] , Alice and Bob proceed as follow:
Then Alice and Bob can separately recover their shared secret
The existence of a quantum subexponential attack forces the use of larger keys for the same level of security, which is partly compensated by the fact that elements are represented in F p , and are thus more compact. Recommended parameter sizes and attack costs from [10] for 80, 128, and 256 bit security are listed in Table 1 . 
Asymptotic complexity of isogeny computation
In this section, we show how to combine the general framework for computing isogenies between curves whose endomorphism ring is isomorphic to a quadratic order (due to Childs, Jao and Soukharev [11] in the ordinary case and to Biasse Jao and Sankar in the supersingular case [5] ) with the efficient evaluation of the class group action of Biasse, Fieker and Jacobson [4] to produce a quantum algorithm that finds an isogeny between E 1 , E 2 . We give two variants of our method:
-Heuristic time complexity 2 O(log(|∆|)) , polynomial quantum memory and quantumly accessible classical memory in 2 O(log(|∆|)) .
-Heuristic time complexity e √ ln(|∆|) ln ln(|∆|) with polynomial memory (both classical and quantum).
Isogenies from solutions to the Hidden Subgroup Problem
As shown in [5, 11] , the computation of an isogeny between E 1 and E 2 such that there is an imaginary quadratic order with O ≃ End(E i ) for i = 1, 2 can be done by exploiting the action of the ideal class group of O on isomorphism classes of curves with endomorphism ring isomorphic to O. In particular, this concerns the cases of -ordinary curves, and -supersingular curves defined over F p .
Assume we are looking for a such that [a]
where [a y ] is the element of Cl(O) corresponding to y ∈ A via the isomorphism Cl(O) ≃ A. Let H be the subgroup of Z/2Z ⋉ A of the periods of f . This means that f (x,
The computation of s can thus be done through the resolution of the Hidden Subgroup Problem in Z/2Z ⋉ A. In [11, Appendix A], Childs, Jao and Soukharev generalized the subexponential-time polynomial space dihedral HSP algorithm of Regev [27] quantumly accessible classical memory. The high-level approach for finding an isogeny from the dihedral HSP is skteched in Algorithm 1. quantumly accessible classical memory overhead when using Kuperberg's second dihedral HSP algorithm [25] This returns an isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 as a composition of isogenies of small degree φ = i φ ei i without increasing the time complexity. Also note that the output fits in polynomial space if the product is not evaluated, otherwise, it needs 2Õ 3 √ log(N ) memory.
Algorithm 1 Quantum algorithm for finding the action in Cl(O)
Input: Elliptic curves E1, E2, imaginary quadratic order O such that End(Ei) ≃ O for i = 1, 2 such that there is [a] ∈ Cl(O) satisfying [a] * E1 = E2. Output: [a] 1: Compute A = Z/d1Z × · · · × Z/d k Z such that A ≃ Cl(O). 2: Find H = {(0, 0), (1,
The quantum oracle
To compute the oracle defined in (1), Childs, Jao and Soukharev [11] used a purely classical subexponential method deriving from the general subexponential class group computation algorithm of Hafner and McCurley [17] . This approach, mentioned in [10] , was first suggested by Couveignes [12] . In a recent independent work [7] , Bonnetain and Schrottenloher used a method that bears similarities with our oracle described in this section. is the neutral element of Cl(O). The high-level approach used in [7] deriving from [4, Alg. 7 ] is the following:
Evaluate the action of
on E 1 by applying the action of the l i for i = 1, . . . , u.
Steps 1 and 2 can be performed as a precomputation.
Step 1 takes quantum polynomial time by using standard techniques for solving an instance of the Hidden Subgroup Problem in Z u where u satisfies p = 4l 1 · · · l u − 1 for small primes l 1 , . . . , l u .
The oracle of Childs, Jao and Soukharev [11] has asymptotic time complexity in 2Õ √ log(|∆|) and requires subexponential space due to the need for the storage of a relation matrix of subexponential dimension. The oracle of Bonnetain and Schrottenloher [7] relies on BKZ [28] lattice reduction in a lattice in Z u . Typically, u ∈ Θ(log(p)) = Θ(log(|∆|)), since q≤l log(q) ∈ Θ(l). In addition to not having a proven space complexity bound, the complexity of BKZ cannot be in eÕ √ log(|∆|) unless the block size is at least in Θ log(|∆|) , which forces the overall complexity to be at best in eÕ √ log(|∆|) .
Our strategy differs from that of Bonnetain and Schrottenloher on the following points:
-Our algorithm does not require the basis l 1 , . . . , l u provided with CSIDH.
-The complexity of our oracle is in eÕ
for the method of [7] ), thus leading to an overall complexity of e O √ log(|∆|) (instead of eÕ √ log(|∆|) for the method of [7] ).
To avoid the dependence on the parameter u, we need to rely on the heuristics stated by Biasse, Fieker and Jacobson [4] on the connectivity of the Caley graph of the ideal class group when a set of edges is S = {p ∈ Poly(log(|∆|))} with #S ≤ log(|∆|) 2/3 where ∆ is the discriminant of O. By assuming [4, Heuristic 2], we state that each class of Cl(O) has a representation over the class of ideals in S with exponents less than e log 1/3 (|∆|) . A quick calculation shows that there are asymptotically many more such products than ideal classes, but their distribution is not well enough understood to conclude that all classes decompose over S with a small enough exponent vector. Numerical experiments reported in [4, Table 2] showed that decompositions of random ideal classes over the first log 2/3 (|∆|) split primes always had exponents significantly less than e log 1/3 (|∆|) . Table 2 . Maximal exponent occurring in short decompositions (over 1000 random elements of the class group). A default choice for our set S could be the first log 2/3 (|∆|) split primes of O (as in Table 2 ). We can derive our results under the weaker assumption that the log 2/3 (|∆|) primes generating the ideal class group do not have to be the first consecutive primes. Assume we know that Cl(O) is generated by at most log 2/3 (|∆|) distinct classes of the split prime ideals of norm up to log c (|∆|) for some constant c > 0. Our algorithm needs to first identify these prime ideals as they might not be the first consecutive primes. Let p 1 , . . . , p k be the prime ideals of norm up to log c (|∆|). We first compute a basis for the lattice L of vectors (e 1 , . . . , e k ) such that i p while hj,j = 1 do 6:
Insert pj at the beginning of S.
7:
Insert the j-th column at the beginning of the list of columns of H.
8:
H ← HNF(H). 9:
end while 10: end for 11: return {p1, . . . , ps} for s = log 2/3 (|∆|).
Proposition 2. Assuming Heuristic 1 for the parameter c, Algorithm 2 is correct and runs in polynomial time in log(|∆|).
Proof.
Step 2 can be done in quantum polynomial time with the S-unit algorithm of Biasse and Song [6] . Assuming that log 2/3 (|∆|) primes of norm less than log c (|∆|) generate Cl(O), the loop of Steps 5 to 9 is entered at most j times as one of [p 1 ], . . . , [p j ] must be in the subgroup generated by the other j − 1 ideal classes. The HNF computation runs in polynomial time, therefore the whole procedure runs in polynomial time.
⊓ ⊔ 
Lemma 1. Let L be an n-dimentional lattice with input basis B ∈ Z n×n , and let β < n be a block size. Then the BKZ variant of [19] used with Kannan's enumeration technique [24] returns a basis (1)) (see [23] ), we get that 4 (γ β ) n−1 β−1 +3 ≤ e n β ln(β)(1+o (1)) . Moreover, this reduction is obtained with a number of calls to Kannan's algorithm that is bounded by Poly(n, Size(B)). According to [20, Th. 2] , each of these calls takes time Poly(n, Size(B))β β( The precomputation of Algorithm 3 allows us to design the quantum circuit that implements the function described in (1). Generic techniques due to Bennett [3] convert any algorithm taking time T and space S into a reversible algorithm taking time T 1+ǫ and space O(S log T ). From a high level point of view, this is simply the adaptation of method of Biasse-Fieker-Jacobson [4, Alg. 7] to the quantum setting. ′ to find u ∈ L close to y.
for j ≤ yi do 7:
end for 9: end for 10: return |E . As long as a number k inÕ log 1−ε (|∆|) of prime ideals of polynomial norm generate the ideal class group and that each class has at least one decomposition involving exponents bounded by eÕ (log 1/2−ε (|∆|)) , the result still holds by BKZ-reducing with block size β = √ k. We refered to Heuristic 1 as it was already present in the previous work of Biasse, Fieker and Jacobson [4] .
For the poly-space variant, these conditions can be relaxed even further. It is known under GRH that a number k inÕ (log(|∆|)) of prime ideals of norm less than 12 log 2 (|∆|) generate the ideal class group. We only need to argue that each class can be decomposed with exponents bounded by eÕ √ log(|∆|) . Then by using the oracle of Algorithm 4 with block size β = √ k, we get a run time of eÕ √ log(|∆|) with a poly-space requirement.
A Remark on Subgroups
It is well-known that the cost of quantum and classical attacks on isogeny based cryptosystems is more accurately measured in the size of the subgroup generated by the ideal classes used in the cryptosystem. As stated in [10] , in order to ensure that this is sufficiently large with high probability, the class number N must have a large divisor M , meaning that there is a subgroup of order M in the class group. Assuming the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics, Hamdy and Saidak [18, Sec. 3] prove that the smoothness probability for class numbers is essentially the same as for random integers of the same size. Thus, for randomly-selected CSIDH system parameters, we expect that the class number will have a large prime divisor.
It is an open problem as to whether subgroups can be exploited to reduce the security of CSIDH, but there are nevertheless some minor considerations that can be taken into account to minimize the risk. Constructing system parameters for which the class number has a large known divisor could be done by a quantum adversary using the polynomialtime algorithm to compute the class group and trial-and-error. Using classical computation, it is in most cases infeasible. Known methods to construct discriminants for which the class number has a known divisor M use a classical result of Nagell [26] relating the problem to finding discriminants ∆ = c 2 D that satisfy c 2 D = a 2 − 4b M for integers a, b, c. These methods thus produce discriminants that are exponential in M , too large for practical purposes.
The one exception where classical computation can be used to find class numbers with a large known divisor is when the divisor M = 2 k . Bosma and Stevenhagen [8] give an algorithm, formalizing methods described by Gauss [16] and Shanks [29] , to compute the 2-Sylow subgroup of the class group of a quadratic field. In addition to describing an algorithm that works in full generality, they prove that the algorithm runs in expected time polynomial in log(|∆|). Using this algorithm would enable an adversary to use trial-and-error efficiently to generate random primes p until a sufficiently large power of 2 divides the class number.
The primes p recommended for use with CSIDH are not amenable to this method, because they are congruent to 3 mod 4, guaranteeing that the class number of the non-maximal order of discriminant −4p is odd. However, in Section 4 of [10] , the authors write that they pick p ≡ 3 (mod 4) because it makes it easy to write down a supersingular curve, but that "in principle, this constraint is not necessary for the theory to work". We suggest that restricting to primes p ≡ 3 (mod 4) is in fact necessary, in order to avoid unnecessary potential vulnerabilities.
Conclusion
We described two variants of a quantum algorithm for computing an isogeny between two elliptic curves E 1 , E 2 defined over a finite field such that there is an imaginary quadratic order O satisfying O ≃ End(E i ) for i = 1, 2 with ∆ = √ ln(|∆|) ln ln(|∆|) while relying only on polynomial (classical and quantum) memory. These variants of the HSPbased algorithms for computing isogenies have the best asymptotic complexity, but we left the assessment of their actual cost on specific instances such as the proposed CSIDH parameters [10] for future work. Some of the constants involved in lattice reduction were not calculated, and more importantly, the role of the memory requirement should be addressed in light of the recent results on the topic [1] .
